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Abstract
Islamic law lays down detailed rules regulating children’s upbringing. This study ex-
amines the effect of such rules on investments in children by analysing the introduction
of Sharia law in northern Nigeria. Difference-in-differences and triple-differences esti-
mates across time, administrative areas and religions show increases in the duration
of breastfeeding and child survival. Geospatial discontinuities further show effects for
Muslims but not Christians living close to the border. Evidence also shows that these
effects concur with a rise in women’s birth rates. Moreover, findings suggest increases
in gender gaps; young boys benefit more than girls and adult women’s intra-household
bargaining power decreases.
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1 Introduction
Sharia law, Islam’s legal system, is applied to varying degrees in around 40 countries.
Economists acknowledge that religious rules or customs can influence individual or collective
behaviour significantly (Iannaccone, 1998; Iyer, 2016). Empirical evidence further points to
strong relationships between religion and outcomes related to children such as fertility (Iyer,
2002; Norris and Inglehart, 2004) or health (Bhalotra et al., 2010) in particular. Yet, there
is little evidence on the causal impact of religious law on parental decisions.
This study estimates the effect of Islamic law on investments in children by exploiting
a natural experiment. In 2000, the 12 northern states of Nigeria introduced Sharia law
(Sharia states) for their Muslim citizens; the other 24 states maintained secular legislation
(non-Sharia states) - see figure 1a. Sharia law contains very precise provisions codifying
the safeguarding of children. Parents found to have violated these child protection laws are
subject to strict penalties, such as large fines, prison sentences or corporal punishment. I
focus on these rules and estimate their effect on two indicators for investments in children:
the duration of breastfeeding and child survival. In the second part of the paper, I investigate
the effect of Sharia on family welfare more broadly. The Nigerian setting has various unique
features, which help to identify the causal effect of Islamic laws. The sudden introduction
of Sharia for Muslims provides unique temporal, geographical and religious variation in laws
that in many other settings stay in place for a long time. Moreover, the application of Islamic
law among treatment states varies with the precise wording of child protection legislation as
well as by exposure to Islamic police. Finally, state borders provide discontinuities in the
application of Sharia in space and time (figure 1b).
I use a triple-differences framework that compares—over time—Muslims in Sharia states
(the treated) to Muslims in non-Sharia states and then juxtaposes these differences with
changes for Christians across the same regions. Estimates from the 2003 Nigerian Demo-
graphic Health Survey (DHS) show that, for Muslims, the duration of breastfeeding increases
by around 1.8 months (around 15% of the pre-treatment average). The estimates also indi-
cate a decrease of around 8 percentage points in the likelihood that a child dies within the
first year of life (around 50% of the pre-treatment average). I reject the hypothesis that the
estimates are the same as for the Christian sample, for which I find no effects. I also use
detailed information on children’s birthdate and examine the exact timing of behavioural
changes in an event study framework. For Muslim children, the event study estimates show
remarkably parallel trends in the years before the Sharia. Outcomes change only after
the introduction of the Sharia. By contrast, the behaviour of Christians does not change.
Moreover, evidence from law reports shows that effects on breastfeeding and child survival
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concur with a marked increase in law enforcement and judgements regarding children thus
suggesting that changes in behaviour are caused by changes in laws.1
To address the concern that the triple-differences estimates are confounded by social,
political or religious changes occurring in Sharia states, I exploit variation in the application
of Islamic law within the treatment states arising from two distinct factors. First, I analyse
the precise wording of the laws introduced by each individual state to group the Sharia states
into high penalty states, where child protection laws are precisely codified and penalties are
strict, and low penalty states, where wordings are more lax and punishments considerably
more moderate. The estimates show considerably larger effects in high penalty than in low
penalty states. Second, enforcement of Sharia was the official and sole remit of hisbah officers,
a newly created cadre with the explicit task of enforcing Islamic law. I approximate exposure
to hisbah patrols—and thus effectiveness of law enforcement—by geographical proximity to
law enforcement facilities. Before the Sharia, outcomes for individuals living in proximity to
or at some distance from law enforcement facilities show parallel trends. Once the Sharia
is introduced, however, changes are significantly stronger for children living within walking
distance of law enforcement facilities. Using proximity to mosques as a placebo, I find no
differences. The advantage of these specifications is that whilst all Muslims in Sharia states
are likely to experience the same socio-political forces, their exposure to Islamic law varies.
An additional identification strategy focuses on the discontinuous change in the appli-
cation of Islamic child protection laws, which occurs in space and in time at the border to
high penalty states. Using their GPS coordinates and exact dates of birth I select children
according to whether i) they live either side of the geographical border to high penalty states
and ii) they are born around the time of the Sharia introduction. Comparisons over time for
Muslim children show effects in line with the estimates for the whole country. The results are
highly robust to different distances to the border, time intervals around the year 2000 and
functional forms. By contrast, the same estimates using the Christian sample show no effects.
Focusing on individuals living adjacent to the border and born just a few years apart allows
me to compare the behaviour of individuals living in a similar environment, some of whom
become exposed to Islamic law and others not. In Africa, the geographical environment has
been argued to be an important determinant of, for instance, general culture and language
(Murdock, 1959), attitudes (Nunn et al., 2015) and economic performance (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2014). Moreover, Afrobarometer data from the border region show that
the Sharia’s introduction did not change two proxies for exposure to Islamic values, which
may confound the estimates: mosque membership and self-identification with Islam.
1I use four measures: the number of incarcerations, the number of court adjournments and the quantity
of court judgements regarding abandoned children and judgements regarding the defilement of minors.
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After presenting the main estimates, I address three identification concerns: i) incidences
of social pressures or civil unrest, ii) state-specific, secular policies, and iii) migration flows.
Since Sharia regulates many different aspects of Muslim life, I examine its effect on two
aspects of family welfare. First, I investigate the interplay between breastfeeding and fertil-
ity choices. Aside from child protection laws, the Sharia contains broader provisions, which
are likely to promote large families. Accordingly, I find significant increases in the yearly
probability of a woman giving birth. Whilst effects are strongest for childless individuals, I
also find an increase for women breastfeeding at the time of the Sharia, albeit much smaller
in size. This last finding stands in contrast with studies highlighting the negative relation-
ship between breastfeeding and fertility (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). I investigate
this apparent contradiction by estimating the effect of Sharia on birth intervals. For women
giving birth after weaning children off the breast, I find an increase of around 2 months,
corresponding roughly to the effect of Sharia on breastfeeding. Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that women breastfeeding at the time of the Sharia increase the duration of
breastfeeding and subsequently attempt to conceive another child almost immediately.
I also examine whether the introduction of Sharia changed gender differences in welfare
and find that it widened gender gaps in breastfeeding and child survival. Effects of Sharia
are strongest for boys, whereas changes for girls are much less pronounced. Moreover, when
considering adult women, I find that Sharia decreased various measures for the bargaining
power of women relative to men, such as, for instance, age at marriage and self-reported
control over finances. Moreover, Sharia increased home work for women thus potentially
also increasing time spent with children.
These results aim to further our understanding of how exposure to religious laws af-
fects parental decisions. Research increasingly indicates that religion interrelates with socio-
economic outcomes such as economic productivity (Andersen et al., 2017), happiness and
economic growth (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015), insurance (Dehejia et al., 2007),
women’s rights (Meyersson, 2014), attitudes (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Guiso et al., 2003),
public goods (Berman and Laitin, 2008) and coping mechanisms (Binzel and Carvalho, forth-
coming). This paper complements these studies by highlighting a hitherto scarcely docu-
mented determinant of child welfare for the world’s fastest growing religion.2 In fact, in a
recent overview article Iyer (2016) highlights the links between religion and demography as
being an under-researched topic by economists. Moreover, the role of child protection legis-
lations highlighted in this paper speaks to the growing knowledge base on the protection of
children (see Doyle and Aizer, 2018; for a review). By linking Islamic laws to child outcomes,
this analysis also relates to studies documenting the social (La Ferrara et al., 2012; Bassi and
2For estimates, see Pew Research Center, 2011.
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Rasul, 2014) and historical (Dell, 2010) influences on reproductive behaviour and children’s
outcomes. The analysis is also relevant to studies pertaining to the trade-off between child
quantity and quality (Black et al., 2005; Qian, 2009; Jensen, 2012).
The next section outlines the introduction of the Sharia in Nigeria and presents the data.
Section 3 lays out the empirical strategy; the results are presented in section 4. Section
5 discusses identification issues. Section 6 provides evidence on Sharia’s effect on family
welfare and section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 The introduction and enforcement of Sharia law in Nigeria
To introduce Sharia law, the 12 northern states (Sharia states) implemented Islamic criminal
law, which contains detailed child protection legislations. As a result of this policy, children’s
rights in Sharia states were protected by secular law before 2000 and by Islamic criminal law
thereafter. The remaining states (non-Sharia states) experienced no change, figure 1a.
2.1.1 The introduction of the Sharia in northern Nigeria
In 1999, Nigeria established its fourth republic, which granted considerable autonomy to
each of its 36 states. In 2000, 12 states3 introduced Islamic criminal law by enacting Sharia
Penal Code (SPC) (Ostien, 2011b). The SPC is based on the Maliki school, which is also
the foundation of Sharia laws in many other countries in North and Western Africa. Sharia
criminal law covers a variety of aspects such as, for instance, homicide, breach of trust,
criminal intimidation or forgery. In line with the Nigerian constitution, Sharia law applied to
Muslims only and Christians were exempt.4 A comprehensive analysis by Oxford University
shows that many concerns regarding the creation of an Islamic state or the application of
harsh punishments remain largely unfounded.5 In the majority of cases, Sharia law was not
forced upon Christians, states remained secular, the Sharia courts worked to the satisfaction
of the general population and harsh punishments were almost never carried out.6
The Sharia introduction was a top down political process, which started in Zamfara state,
in the very northwest of the country, by its governor Ahmed Sani. On October 27th, 1999,
3The states adopting the Sharia are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi,
Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara state.
4The Sharia introducing states argued that because the Sharia only applied to Muslims, forbidding to
implement it would violate Muslims’ constitutionally protected religious freedom.
5See https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/content/exploring-15-years-sharia-implementation-northern-nigeria.
6Moreover, the federal government also retained monopoly over state security and police. The northern
states must thus rely on the central police force.
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Sani declared the adoption of Sharia laws for his state, Zamfara, which was adopted on 27th
of January, 2000. Sani encouraged other states with a Muslim majority to follow suit and
within a short time, the 11 other northern states did so. Overall, the Sharia introduction
was driven predominantly by state governors or state assemblies (see Boer, 2007).7
Evidence based on news reports and public prints in panel a of figure 2 shows that the
number of Islamic judgements—including judgements related to family matters—increased
considerably after 2000 (Weimann, 2007; 2010).8 Since not all Islamic criminal cases were
reported by news outlets or NGOs, the real number of cases is likely to be substantially
higher (see section 4.3 for more details). Moreover, data collected by Ostien (2011b) shows a
marked increase in the number of judges from 1992 to 2008 in Sharia states (see figure 2b).9
The only Islamic regulations applied in northern Nigeria before 2000 were Islamic family
law. Nevertheless, these provisions had no effect on young children’s rights for two reasons.
First and most importantly, child protection legislation in the Sharia falls under criminal law
and not family legislation. Family law as practiced in northern Nigeria pre-2000 essentially
focused only on marriage, divorce and inheritance. Before 2000, no Islamic criminal law was
implemented anywhere in Nigeria whatsoever (Ostien, 2007). Second, before 2000 Islamic
family law judgements were not final and could be overturned by secular courts. Secular
judgements, by contrast, could not be changed by religious courts (Ostien, 2007).
2.1.2 Laws regarding the family and children - before and after 2000
Reports by the Oxford Department for International Development suggests that Sharia law
delivered efficient access to justice.10 Women were the major beneficiaries with over 70
percent of complaints heard by courts made by women, the vast majority regarding issues
related to children and marriage. The fast, non-technical workings of Sharia courts were
very popular with high satisfaction ratings by women between 52 to 89 percent (Tabiu and
Bello, 2016).
Secular laws protecting children: Secular laws were in force in Sharia states before
2000 and were applied in non-Sharia states throughout. According to this set of rules,
parents would lose custody if they abandoned or neglected their children (see Uzodike, 1990;
for more details). For instance, in Williams v Williams the court decided that the care of
7For instance, in Bauchi the Sharia bill was read by the House of Assembly for approval (see Boer, 2007).
8The author uses sources such as articles from print media, mainly from Nigeria but also from inter-
national sources. Other sources include the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks and
reports from NGOs working in the region, e.g. BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights and Human Rights
Watch.
9Unfortunately, the only two years for which data are available are 1992 and 2008.
10Available under https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/content/exploring-15-years-sharia-implementation-northern-nigeria,
accessed February 2020
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the mother was superior to the one of the father. However, no party was punished. Instead,
custody was transferred to the mother.11 If the neglect results in harm, parents are liable
to 1 year of imprisonment. In fact, NGO reports suggest that before the introduction of the
Sharia national policies had no significant impact on families and children.12
Islamic laws protecting children: The Sharia Penal Code introduced in Sharia states
in 2000 classifies neglect of and misbehaviour towards children as qisa or related offences.
This implies that retaliation is a permissible form of punishment (see Ostien, 2011b). Laws
protecting the welfare of children can roughly be grouped into three categories: abandon-
ment, neglect and harm of young children (see appendix A for a schematic outline).
Child abandonment is defined as exposing a child under the age of 15 or leaving her in a
place with the intention of abandoning her. Any parent found guilty of abandoning a child
is liable to be incarcerated for a term of up to three years and to up to 40 lashes.
Children below the age of 15, have the right to be looked after, protected, fed and
clothed.13 The punishment for neglecting children consists of imprisonment of up to one
year, a fine or both. If the neglect of parents causes the health of the child to suffer, the
punishment increases to up to five years imprisonment and a payment of diya (of value 100
camels, 1,000 gold dinars).14 Sons and daughters should be treated equally.15
The SPC also codifies obligations of children towards their parents. After reaching adult-
hood, when parents are unable to sustain themselves, children are required to maintain their
parents. Offenders are liable to up to two years imprisonment and caning of up to 50 lashes.16
2.2 Data, Sample and Measurements
This study employs data drawn from the 2003 round of the Demographic Health Survey
(DHS) for Nigeria, a nationally representative survey of Nigerian households. Panel a of
appendix B shows the location of the clusters. The DHS is part of the Demographic and
Health Surveys series and collects extensive information on health, nutrition and complete
birth histories of interviewed women. The 2003 DHS interviewed 7,620 women aged 15-49.17
11See Theresa Temitayo Williams v Rasheed Ahmet Williams SC 171/1985 in All Nigeria Law Reports,
1987. The Nigerian law firm Yusuf Ali & Co provides more examples.
12see http://www.crin.org/en/docs/resources/treaties/crc.13/Nigeria_CWL_NGO_Report.pdf.
13Whoever having the charge or care of a child under the age of fifteen years or being in a position of
authority over him wilfully ill-treats or neglects him in such a way as to cause him unnecessary suffering, or
denies him access to education shall be punished, Ostien 2011b.
14Or or 12,000 silver dirhams (Ostien 2011b).
15Whenever a child was born among them, Aisha would not ask if it were a boy or a girl. Instead she
would ask, ”Is the child healthy (and without defect)?” If she was told, ”Yes,” she would say, All praise is
for Allah, Lord of All the Worlds (Narrated by Aisha from Saheeh Al-Bukhari).
16These are the same offences as the idle person offences outlined above, (Ostien, 2011b).
17The data are publicly available at measuredhs.com.
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Panel A of table 1 reports the summary statistics. Around half of interviewed women,
47 percent, are Muslim, 61 percent of women have completed primary education and the
average number of children at the time of the survey is 2.6.
For the whole of Nigeria (column 1), the average duration of breastfeeding for children
born before the introduction of the Sharia is 16.4 months. This number is lower than for the
median of Sub-Saharan countries covered by the DHS, 20.7 months. In the sample 13.5% of
children die within the first year.18 The descriptive evidence in columns 2 and 3 of table 1
also suggests considerable differences between states that introduced the Sharia and states
that did not. On average, women in Sharia states are predominantly Muslim, poorer, show
lower educational attainment and higher fertility. Child survival is also lower in the north.
Women in Sharia states breastfeed for longer, on average, than in the south: 17.2 months
compared to 15.6. High and low penalty states appear more similar (columns 4 and 5).
3 Estimation framework
This paper establishes a causal effect of Sharia law on two dependent variables i) the number
of months a child is breastfed for and ii) a dummy for whether a child died in the first year
of life. I start by estimating various difference-in-differences specifications, which compare
outcomes over time, states and religions. Thereafter, I exploit variation in the application of
Islamic laws within the 12 Sharia states arising from two factors: state-specific child protec-
tion laws and exposure to Islamic law enforcement officers. Finally, I use the discontinuous
change in legislations, which occurs in space and in time at state borders.
3.1 Difference-in-differences and triple-differences estimators
Difference-in-differences using three control groups: The first model is a difference-
in-differences specification, which compares—over time—Muslims in Sharia states (i.e. the
treatment group) to individuals living in non-Sharia states. I estimate the following model
yist = γssharias × postt +Xistβdd + φs + τt + ist (1)
where yist denotes outcome y for individual i in year t in state s, sharias = 1 if individual
i resides in a state that introduced the Sharia and postt = 1 if individual i was born at a
time, which exposes him or her to the Sharia (depending on the outcome, typically from
18This is often referred to as infant mortality.
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1999 onwards). Furthermore, Xist consists of time-varying covariates for the individual
19; φs
and τt are state and year specific unobservable characteristics (so called state or year fixed
effects). Since they were exempt, I drop Christians in Sharia states. The reference group in
this specification consists of all individuals in non-Sharia states.
By comparing individuals living in two different areas of the country over time, the
specification in equation 1 differences out time-invariant differences between Muslims in
Sharia states and individuals in non-Sharia states. However, if there are any time-varying
differences between Muslims and Christians, the coefficient γs would attribute these to the
introduction of the Sharia. To address this possibility, I re-estimate equation 1 using a second
control group: Muslims in non-Sharia states.
The third specification compares Muslims and Christians living in Sharia states over time.
For this, I estimate a specification similar to equation 1 with an interaction between the post
dummy and an indicator variable taking the value 1 if child i is Muslim (muslimi×postt). I
estimate this specification for individuals residing in states that introduced the Sharia only;
the reference group consists of Christians living in Sharia states.
By comparing the behaviour of Muslims and Christians in Sharia states over time, the
third specification differences out time-invariant differences between individuals belonging
to these two religions in Sharia states. This specification, thus, addresses many concerns
regarding unobserved factors in Sharia states. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that
Christians living in Sharia states did not remain unaffected by the changes in 2000 and are
thus not a good control group. The introduction of the Sharia, for instance, was accompanied
by worsening inter-religious relations as well as by an increased number of clashes between
Muslims and Christians.20
Triple differences estimator: To investigate whether Christians in Sharia states changed
their behaviour as a response to the Sharia introduction, I carry out a placebo check. For this,
I re-estimate the difference-in-differences specification in equation 1 comparing Christians in
Sharia and non-Sharia states. If religious tensions in Sharia states indeed led to behavioural
changes for Christians, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient γs would be large and
statistically significant. To test whether the coefficients are statistically different between
the Christian and Muslim sub-samples, I pool all observations in a triple difference framework
19Covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies for
child’s year of birth and gender.
20https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-03-10/roots-nigerias-religious-and-ethnic-conflict.
Accessed May 2017.
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and estimate the following equation
yist = γmmuslimi + γspsharias × postt + γmpmuslimi × postt + γsmsharias ×muslimi
+ γsmpsharias ×muslimi × postt +Xistβdd + φs + τt + ist (2)
where sharias×muslimi× postt is the triple interaction between individual i residing in
a state that introduced the Sharia (sharias), him or her being muslim (muslimi) and being
born at a point in time that exposed her to the Sharia (postt). The identifying assumption
in the triple differences framework relies on the absence of time varying differences between
individuals in Sharia and non-Sharia states, which affect Muslims and Christians differently.
Event study estimates: I investigate whether breastfeeding and infant mortality grow
at different rates for Muslims in Sharia states—perhaps due to differences in preferences
regarding children—by estimating a number of event studies. For this, I exploit the exact
timing of the Sharia introduction and estimate whether changes in breastfeeding or child
survival occurred at the same time as the policy change. Grouping children into 6 month
birth cohorts I re-estimate equation 1 substituting the postt dummy with indicator variables
for these cohorts. This model is estimated for Muslims and Christians separately. If the
Sharia indeed affected investments in children, one would expect Muslims in Sharia states to
change their behaviour (relative to Muslims in non-Sharia states) only after the Sharia has
been introduced. Before the Sharia, by contrast, the time trends of both groups should be
parallel. Outcomes for Christians, in turn, should remain unaffected. I also statistically test
for parallel trends, by choosing children too old to be affected by the Sharia and interact the
treatment dummy (shariai) with a linear time trend for the child’s month of birth.
3.2 Heterogeneity in Islamic laws and Sharia’s enforcement
The identifying assumption of the triple-differences framework in equation 2 is that—after
accounting for unobservable state and time characteristics—there are no time varying fac-
tors between Sharia and non-Sharia states, which affect Muslims and Christians differently
and which occur simultaneously with the Sharia introduction. This assumption would be
violated, if, for instance, the Sharia introduction reflects the Islamisation of the northern
states. If the northern states had already been shifting towards Islam, individuals could
have used the increased freedom of expression granted by the fourth republic to adopt more
overt Muslim practices. Alternatively, the Sharia could have increased the salience of Islam
and its values, which could have altered individual preferences (Bassi and Rasul, 2014).
To address these concerns, I note that—for Muslims in Sharia states—the application of
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Islamic laws varies by two factors. First, the exact wording of laws regarding children varies
from one Sharia state to the next. Second, the effectiveness of law enforcement varies with
the presence of hisba officers (civil servants specifically tasked with implementing Sharia).
The advantage of these two specifications is that Muslims across Sharia states are likely to
be subject to similar socio-political forces; their exposure to Islamic law, however, varies.
i) Exploiting inter-state heterogeneity in child protection laws: Whilst all 12 north-
ern states introduced the Sharia, the exact wording of child protection policies varies con-
siderably from one state to the next. Crucially, four states specify markedly laxer child
protection laws. These states also codify significantly reduced penalties for parents found
to have harmed their children.21 For example, Kaduna decriminalised child abandonment.
In Sokoto corporal punishment for this crime is abolished and the prison sentence decreased
from three years to one. Jigawa and Kebbi, in turn, decreased penalties for the harming
of children. Both states abolish the prohibitively high diyah and Jigawa also decreases the
prison sentence from five to three years (see Ostien, 2011b). I define these 4 states as low
penalty and the remaining 8 as high penalty states.
If factors such as the salience of Islam or pressures due to Islamisation were driving
behaviour, one would expect effects in both high and low penalty to be of similar size. Any
difference between the two sets of states, by contrast, is likely to be the result of differences
in child protection laws. I test for this by estimating
yist = γhhighs × postt + γllows × postt +Xistβdd + φs + τt + ist (3)
where lows = 1 and highs = 1 if individual i resides in low or high penalty states respec-
tively. The control group consists of individuals in non-Sharia states and I drop Christians
in Sharia states. In this estimation, γh and γl indicate differences between Muslims living in
high and low penalty Sharia states on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other.
A possible concern is that high penalty states introduce stricter child protection laws
because of underlying preferences, which also cause trends in child outcomes to diverge over
time. I explore this possibility by testing for parallel trends between high and low penalty
states and the rest of the country.
ii) Exposure to hisbah patrols: When the northern states introduced Sharia, they as-
signed responsibility of enforcing the newly established laws to hisbah officers (Ostien, 2007).
This new cadre of civil servants was the first point of contact between citizens and the jus-
21These are Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto.
11
tice system and, as such, hisbah officers would work alongside and together with the federal
police (Adamu, 2008). Hisbah officers patrol the streets and can be approached by anyone
with a complaint (Mustapha and Mustapha, 2016). The issue would then be forwarded
to the Sharia courts. Both legally and practically, hisbah officers are a key institution for
implementing Sharia and a major determinant of the efficacy of law enforcement (Ostien,
2011a). Hisbah patrols were particularly important for safeguarding women’s rights (Nazir,
2007). However, due to limited funds, the coverage of hisbah officers remained irregular.22
I approximate exposure to hisbah patrols—and thus effectiveness of law enforcement—by
the geographical location of law enforcement facilities. For this, I digitised the geographic
coordinates of hisbah stations, police sites and other law enforcement facilities in the 12
Sharia states.23 See map in appendix B. Overlaying this with the GPS coordinates of
survey respondents I then calculate the distance between interviewees and the closest law
enforcement facility and compare behaviour at different distances.
To identify individuals with likely exposure to hisba patrols, I group individuals in Sharia
states into two groups: individuals living within 30 minutes walk of the closest law enforce-
ment facility (closei=1) and individuals living further than 30 minutes walk (fari=1).
24
Around a quarter of respondents live within 30 minutes walk from the closest law enforce-
ment facility. The results are stable to using different cut-offs. I then compare the behaviour
of these two groups over time to the rest of Nigeria by interacting the two aforementioned
dummy variables with the postt indicator (closei×postt and fari×postt) and a specification
similar to the one outlined equation 3. Since they did not introduce child-protection laws,
I drop low-penalty states from this estimation. I also test for the difference between these
two interactions by using a triple-differences specification similar to equation 2.25
One concern with this approach is that proximity to law enforcement facilities may cap-
ture factors other than exposure to hisbah patrols, such as general rural/urban differences,
for instance. I address this concern in three ways. First, I estimate this specification for
urban areas only. Second, I carry out a placebo treatment distinguishing behaviour by the
distance to the closest Islamic centre, typically a mosque or an Islamic social club, rather
than the closest law enforcement facility. See map in appendix B.26 If rural/urban differences
22Early fears that the hisbah would become a paramilitary organisation have remained widely unrealised
(Mustapha and Mustapha, 2016).
23I combined data from the Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development,
GRID3, programme (available at https://grid-nigeria.org) with data from Oak Ridge Laboratory (avail-
able nga.geopode.world).
24I define 30 minutes walking as 2.75km, in line with most walking speeds reported around 3.4 miles per
hour. The results are stable to different cut-offs.
25Since I do not have information on law enforcement facilities in non-Sharia states, this specification
cannot control for the closei × sharias interaction.
26To calculate the distance between each individual and the closest Mosque, I overlay the GPS coordinates
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are confounding the estimates, one would expect the distance to Islamic centres to affect the
estimates. Using proximity to Islamic centres has an additional advantage. If the Sharia
affects behaviour by increasing the salience of Islam or by changing incentives to signal one’s
adherence to Islamic customs, rather than through its laws, its effect should be particularly
strong for individuals living in close proximity to Islamic centres.
Third, I plot behaviour of individuals living less and more than 30 minutes walk from
the closest law enforcement facility over time against individuals in non-Sharia states in an
event study framework. If proximity to law enforcement facilities affects exposure to Islamic
law, one would expect parallel trends for both groups before the Sharia’s introduction. After
its implementation, changes in behaviour should be more pronounced for individuals living
closer to law enforcement facilities. Proximity to mosques, by contrast, should not matter.
3.3 Geospatial discontinuities in Islamic child protection laws
An additional identification strategy exploits the discontinuous change in exposure to Islamic
child protection laws that occurs in both space and in time at the border between some
Nigerian states. Individuals in high penalty states (dark grey in figure 1a) experience drastic
changes in their exposure to child protection laws: from lay legislations before 2000 to strict
Islamic criminal child protection laws thereafter. In adjacent states no such change occurs.
In non-Sharia states (white in figure 1a), laws do not change at all. In low penalty states
(light grey in figure 1a), Islamic laws are introduced but child protection legislation is much
laxer than in high penalty states.
In this setting, I zoom in and select children according to two criteria: i) they live
geographically close to the high penalty border (red in figure 1b) and ii) they are born in
the years just before and after the Sharia introduction. By focusing on this specific sample,
I can compare—over time—children born into a similar geographical environment within a
relatively short time from one another. For this, I estimate the following specification
yist = γbhighs × postt +Xistβdd + f(locationi) +
10∑
σ=1
segmentσ + φs + τt + ist (4)
where f(locationi) is a low-order polynomial for the geographical location of individual
i. I report different specifications for f(locationi). I partition the border separating high
penalty from other states into 10 roughly equal segments and control for time-invariant,
unobservable heterogeneity along these by including a dummy for each as
∑10
σ=1 segmentσ.
of DHS respondents with information on all Mosques in the northern states drawn from the Geo-Referenced
Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development (GRID3) programme.
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Also, highs = 1 if individual i resides in a state that introduced strict child protection laws
(a high penalty state). The remaining variables are defined as above. This specification is
similar to differences-in-discontinuities estimators employed recently (Grembi et al., 2016).
Appendix E re-creates this estimator with a full set of interactions.
When estimating equation 4, I use different bandwidths for both space and for time.
First, I use the GPS coordinates of respondents to identify children living at different dis-
tances from the border. Second, I use the birthdays of children to select individuals born at
different intervals around the year of the Sharia introduction. Since high penalty states share
boundaries with both low penalty and non-Sharia states (see figure 1a), I use two control
groups: i) non-Sharia and low penalty states and ii) low penalty states only (see appendix B
for a map of this border). As before, I focus on Muslims and use Christians as a placebo.
Focusing on children born close to each other in both space and time has a number of ad-
vantages. Individuals living in geographical proximity to one another are likely to exposed to
similar social norms (Alesina et al., 2013), land rights (Fenske, 2013), diversity (Michalopou-
los, 2012), disease environment (Alsan, 2015) and history (Nunn, 2008). Moreover, children
born a few years apart are likely to be exposed to similar socio-economic and political forces.
By comparing behaviour over time, the specification in equation 4 can difference out at least
some of these confounding factors.
One such possible confounding factor is that the Sharia changed behaviour by increasing
Islam’s salience or by changing parental preferences. To test for this possibility, I select
individuals living in states either side of the high penalty border and compare two proxies
for exposure to Islam or preferences (mosque membership27 and identification with Islam28)
across the 1999 and 2003 rounds of the the Afrobarometer survey.29 I use difference-in-
differences specifications and find no significant effects; see Appendix C.
4 The Sharia’s effect on breastfeeding and mortality
The results suggest that the Sharia introduction increased the duration of breastfeeding,
decreased infant mortality and had a marked effect on judgements regarding children.
27The exact question is Could you tell me whether you are an active member, inactive member or not a
member of a church or mosque or religious organisation?
28The exact question is Besides being Nigerian, which group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?
29Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than 30 African countries and collect information on
attitudes towards social, religious, political and economic topics as well as on experiences of crime and
violence. Surveys are available under http://www.afrobarometer.org/.
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4.1 Breastfeeding estimates
The dependent variable is the duration a child is breastfed for, measured in months.30 The
DHS reports information on the duration of breastfeeding for children born in the 5 years
prior to the interview. Due to censoring, I consider only children aged at least 20 months
at time of interview (the results are robust to different cut-offs). The post dummy takes the
value 1 if the child is born after June 1999 since children born before the Sharia are breastfed
until after its introduction (again, the results are robust to different definitions of the post
dummy). The resulting sample consists of 3,540 children born 1998 to 2001. I also estimate
a duration analysis model where the post dummy takes the value 1 if the month-observation
is after January 2000. The results are stable and available upon request. For Muslims in
Sharia states, the mean in the pre-period is 17.2 months.
Difference-in-differences and triple-differences estimates: Columns 1 and 2 of
panel A of table 2 compare Muslims in Sharia states to individuals in non-Sharia states.
The point estimate is around 1.2 months, corresponding to 7 percent of the pre-treatment
mean. Comparing Muslims to Christians in Sharia states (column 3) and to Muslims in
non-Sharia states (column 4) renders very similar effects. The placebo treatment in column
5 that compares Christians in Sharia and non-Sharia states shows no effect. Column 6
combines the estimates of columns 4 and 5 in a triple differences specification and gives an
increase of around 2 months.
Event study estimates: To investigate the exact timing of behavioural changes, I
group children into 6 month birth cohorts and re-estimate equation 1 substituting postt with
dummies for each of these cohorts. Since the 2003 DHS only collects information on children
born 1998 and before, I add individuals interviewed under the 1999 DHS for the event study
estimates. Panel A of figure 3 shows a parallel time trend for Muslims in Sharia and non-
Sharia states. After the Sharia’s introduction, the duration of breastfeeding increases almost
immediately. The coefficients are jointly highly significant with a p-value of 0.003. Panel B
of figure 3 carries out a placebo comparing Christians in Sharia and non-Sharia states and
shows no significant changes (p-value 0.191).
Child protection laws and proximity to law enforcement facilities: Column 7
of panel A in table 2 shows that the increase in breastfeeding is concentrated amongst high
penalty states. Moreover, columns 1 and 3 of panel A in table 3 show that increases in
breastfeeding are stronger for individuals living within 30 minutes walk of the closest law
enforcement facility. These differences are statistically significant (columns 2 and 4). These
differences hold for the urban sub-sample (columns 5 and 6). By contrast, the distance
30If a child is not breastfed, the dependent variable is coded as 0.
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to the closest Islamic centre, does not change the impact of the Sharia (column 7). The
difference for individuals living more or less than 30 minutes walk is small, 0.2 months, and
not statistically significant.
Geospatial estimates: Panel a of table 4 compares the behaviour of Muslims either side
of the high penalty border over time. I use three different geographic distances: individuals
living 100km, 75km and 50km either side of the border.31 In columns 1, 2 and 3 I compare
Muslims in high penalty states to Muslims in low penalty and in non-Sharia states on the
other. The estimates are stable across the different bandwidths and of a similar order of
magnitude to the ones presented in table 2, around 1.9 months. Columns 4, 5 and 6 narrow
the time window around the introduction of the Sharia and consider children born June
1998 to December 2000. The estimates remain similar. In columns 7, 8 and 9 I select
Muslims in Sharia states only and compare across high and low penalty states. Again, the
estimates remain very similar. Finally, in columns 10, 11 and 12 I carry out a placebo
test comparing Christians either side of the border and find no effect. Appendix E re-
estimates these specifications using different specifications for f(location). Among these, it
re-creates differences-in-discontinuities estimates used recently (see Grembi et al., 2016; as
an example). The results remain robust.
Panels a and b of figure 5 illustrate the results graphically. Following the approach by
Dell et al. (forthcoming), these are three-dimensional versions of two-dimensional regression
discontinuity figures. The x- and y-axis denote longitude and latitude respectively. The
high penalty border is shown in red and the areas represent 50km bands around the bound-
ary. The colour (the third dimension) denotes the mean outcome variable, where darker
shades correspond to higher values. In the pre-period (panel a) no significant differences are
apparent, which increase considerably in the post period (panel b).
4.2 Infant mortality estimates
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a child is reported to have died within the first year
of its life—defined as infant mortality—and 0 otherwise. This definition fits well with child
protection laws of the Sharia, which focus on very young children and has been analysed in a
variety of different contexts, even for high-income countries (Chen et al., 2016; for instance).
The DHS reports the age at death of each child ever born to a woman. Due to censoring,
I select children aged at least 14 months at the time of interview. The results are stable to
different cut-offs. The post dummy takes the value 1 if the child is born after January 1999
since these children are potentially still alive at the time of the Sharia introduction. The
31Since the DHS randomly displaces the GPS coordinates of some individuals by up to 5km, I do not
include clusters within 5km of the border.
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results are stable to different definitions of the post dummy. The sample consists of 9,065
children born 1994-2002. For Muslims in Sharia states, the mean in the pre-period is 0.154.
Difference-in-differences and triple-differences estimates: Columns 1 and 2 of
panel B in table 2 compare Muslims in Sharia states to children in non-Sharia states and
show a decrease of 4 percentage points corresponding to around 25% of the pre-treatment
mean. A comparison of Muslims to Christians in Sharia states (column 3) and Muslims
in non-Sharia states (column 4) shows slightly larger estimates, 5 and 8 percentage points
respectively. The placebo in column 5 using the Christians sample, by contrast, shows no
effect of the Sharia, which is equally precisely estimated. The triple differences estimates in
column 6 indicate a decrease of around 10 percentage points.
Event study estimates: The conditional event study estimates shown in panels c
and d of figure 3 show that before 1999, Muslims in Sharia and non-Sharia states exhibit
remarkably parallel trends. For children born after 1999, the trends diverge markedly. The
coefficients are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.001. By contrast, the placebo treatment
using Christians shows no discernible pattern with an insignificant p-value of 0.380.
Child protection laws and proximity to law enforcement facilities: Finally,
the estimates in column 7 of panel B in table 2 show that the decrease in mortality was
substantially larger in high penalty than in low penalty states. As before, panel B in table
3 shows that decreases are significantly more pronounced for individuals living close to law
enforcement facilities, even for the urban sample (columns 1 to 6). By contrast, decreases
in mortality are almost identical for individuals living within or more than 30 minutes from
the closest Islamic centre.
Figure 4 shows the exact timing of changes in infant mortality by distance to the closest
law enforcement facility (panel a) and Islamic centre (panel b). Before the Sharia’s introduc-
tion, mortality rates of Muslims living within 30 minutes walking distance (solid lines) and
further than 30 minutes walk (dashed lines) from the closest law enforcement facility show
parallel trends to Muslims in non-Sharia states. Time trends are also parallel for distance
to the nearest Islamic centre. After the Sharia’s implementation, the drop in mortality rates
is considerably steeper for Muslims living within 30 minutes walking distance to the nearest
law enforcement facility than for individuals living further away. The difference in changes
between the two groups is statistically significant with p=0.001. Effects for Muslims living
within or more than 30 minutes walk from the nearest Islamic centre do not differ. This
difference is not statistically different (p=0.996).
Geospatial estimates: As before, panel b of table 4 compares Muslims at three dis-
tances (100km, 75km and 50km) either side of the high penalty state border. The parameter
estimates comparing Muslims in high penalty states to Muslims in both low penalty and in
17
non-Sharia states (columns 1, 2 and 3) show a decrease of 4 to 6 percentage points. Nar-
rowing the time window to children born July 1995 to December 2000 (columns 4, 5 and 6)
or comparing Muslims in high and low penalty states only (columns 7, 8 and 9) gives very
similar results. The placebo treatment using Christians (columns 10, 11 and 12) shows no
effects. As before, appendix E uses different functional forms and re-creates the differences-
in-discontinuity estimates. The results remain robust. Panel c of figure 5 shows no significant
differences in infant mortality rates for children living close to the high penalty border and
born before the Sharia’s introduction. Panel d shows a marked decrease in mortality rates
for children in high penalty born after the Sharia’s introduction.
4.3 Enforcement of Islamic laws
Data from the Nigerian Department of Justice (National Bureau of Statistics, various years)
show that the Sharia increased the number of judgements regarding children, suggesting that
changes in behaviour are caused by changes in laws. I digitised information on four aspects
of law enforcement for the years around 2000 and compare Sharia and non-Sharia states
using a difference-in-differences framework similar to the one in equation 1.32
Column 1 of table 5 indicates that the Sharia increased the number of prisoners by around
15% (compared to the pre-treatment average). Since all legally binding judgements are based
on the Koran, all new incarcerations are the result of Islamic criminal judgements. Column
2 shows that the number of adjournments decreased by around 100% of the pre-2000 mean.
Adjournments are commonly interpreted as an inefficiency of the judicial system. Hence the
results suggest that the Sharia caused courts to decrease delays and pass more judgements.
Crucially for this analysis, the Sharia states are found to have strongly enforced judge-
ments regarding children. Column 3 of table 5 reports the number of instances a court ruled
for a child to be considered as abandoned. The estimates suggest an increase of 5 judgements
per state per year, corresponding to 50% of the pre-2000 mean. Column 4 shows the number
of instances that courts ruled for child defilement. The estimates suggest an increase of 6
judgments per state per year, which is more than 90% of the pre-treatment mean.
4.4 Robustness
I carry out a number of robustness checks. In a first instance, appendix D investigates the
robustness of the estimates by dropping children at different time intervals before and after
the Sharia introduction, dropping children Zamfara state, where the Sharia introduction was
32I used the Annual Abstract of Statistics for Nigeria (1998-2006), which reports number of judgements
of various offences.
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initiated and also by dropping northern states with a significant Shia minority.33 The results
remain robust throughout. Moreover, in appendix F, I formally test for parallel trends in
the pre-period for a number of control groups. For this, I interact a linear timetrend with
the treatment dummy. Throughout all control groups the estimates are small in size and
not statistically significant. Finally, appendix C uses Afrobarometer data to investigate
whether the introduction of the Sharia increased exposure to Islam. Estimates from high
penalty and their adjacent states suggest no impact on two proxies: mosque membership
and identification with Islam. These results suggest that religious exposure or the salience
of Islam are unlikely to be the major drivers behind changes in breastfeeding and mortality.
5 Identification issues
The causal interpretation of the triple-differences estimates relies on the assumption that—
after accounting for unobservable state and time characteristics—there are no time varying
factors specific to Sharia states, which affect Muslims and Christians differently and which
occur at the same time as the Sharia introduction. This section brings new data to the
analysis and examines three factors, which may violate this assumption: i) social tensions
or violence, ii) state-specific, lay policies and iii) migration patterns.
Pressures to act in accordance with Islam and social tensions: Although the Boko
Haram insurgency started well after the time window considered here, in 2009, it is possi-
ble that the introduction of the Sharia led to social pressure, civil unrest or even conflict.
To investigate this possibility I use Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) data to
construct a panel, which sums incidences of violence for each Nigerian state in each year. I
then compare incidences over time in Sharia and non-Sharia states.
The results in table 6 suggest no effect of the Sharia on violent conflict. These findings
hold for different types of violence (columns 1 and 4), for high and low penalty states (columns
2 and 4) and for the border regions (columns 3 and 6). Appendix G reports means for the
years between 1997 and 2009 and shows no differences in the incidences of violence in Sharia
states. After 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency began and violence spiked in the north.
Unrelated, state-specific policies I also investigate whether Sharia and non-Sharia states
introduced lay, state-specific policies, which may confound the effect of the Sharia on parental
investments. I find no effect of Sharia on various measurements for state interventions.
33These are Kano, Katsina, Kaduna and Sokoto.
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I use expenditure by state governments as a proxy for state-specific polices. For this, I
digitised information on local government finances from Annual Reports of the Central Bank
of Nigeria (Nigerian Central Bank, various years) for the years 1996 to 1998 and 2001 to
2003.34 The resulting dataset is a panel where each state provides 6 observations, one for
each year between 1996 to 1998 and 2001 to 2003.
I compare Sharia and non-Sharia states in a difference-in-differences framework. Panel
A of table 7 shows that the Sharia had no significant impact on recurrent, capital or total
state expenditures. Moreover, appendix H shows that the time trend in total expenditures
is parallel throughout the observation window.
I also investigate changes in health care facilities, which are important determinants of
child health (see Bu¨tikofer et al., 2019; for an example). Data from the Ministry of Health
various years for the years 1991 and 2004 show that the number of health facilities per
inhabitant did not change significantly across Sharia and non Sharia states (see appendix I).
Migration A further concern is that the introduction of the Sharia induced some individuals
to migrate in or out of the 12 Sharia states. Using past migration histories contained in the
DHS, I estimate the effect of the Sharia on the probability of respondents migrating. For
each respondent, I construct a panel consisting of 7 observations, one for each year between
1997 and 2003. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if individual i migrated in that
particular year. Panel B of table 7 uses the same specifications as in the main estimates
and finds no significant impact on whether or not respondents migrated. Moreover, the
event study estimates reported in appendix H show that the time trends across Sharia and
non-Sharia states appear to be parallel.
To further asses the importance of migration, I re-estimate the effect of Sharia dropping
individuals, who migrated after the introduction of the Sharia. Appendix D shows that the
impact of Sharia is robust to the exclusion of migrants.
In addition to the above, I use the Migration and Remittances Household Surveys (MHS)
carried out by the World Bank in 2009/10 to investigate intra-state migration patterns.35
Using information on migration histories, I construct a panel where each household con-
tributes three observations (one for the years 1990-95, 1995-99 and 2000-05) and find no
effect (see panel C of table 7). The MHS also inquires about the reasons for migration. As
34State expenditures are divided into two: recurrent expenditures and capital expenditures. Recurrent
expenditures consist of payments of civil servant salaries, pensions or payment of utility bills for public
buildings. Capital expenditures refer to payments related to capital projects. I adjust nominal expenditures
using the CPI as reported by the Central Bank of Nigeria. To this, I add the population information outlined
above (National Bureau of Statistics, various years).
35The data are publicly available under http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/402/
related_materials.
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appendix J shows, no respondent reported Sharia law.
6 Household decisions and female welfare
Sharia law regulates many different aspects of Muslim life. Consequently, it is possible that
Islamic laws have more far reaching impacts on decisions taken by household and the welfare
of its members. For the sake of conciseness I focus on two aspects, which are of particular
interest to economists: the interplays between investments in children and fertility choices
on the one hand and the welfare of girls and women on the other.
6.1 Interplays between investments in children and fertility choices
Islamic law can also affect parental choices by changing the demand for children. The Sharia
contains numerous provisions altering the costs of and returns to children. For example, the
SPC requires children to maintain their parents in old age and specifies severe punishments
for neglecting one’s family (see section 2.1.2) thus increasing incentives to bear children.
Moreover, the Sharia can increase the incentive to bear children in other, less direct ways.
Izugbara and Ezeh (2010) provide qualitative evidence that women use high fertility rates
as an insurance against divorce or their husband marrying other women.36 Burnham (1987),
moreover, points out that the resources allocated to each wife in a polygynous marriage are
proportional to the number of her children. Alternatively, the Sharia could affect fertility the
position of women and their rights (see Allen, 2015; Godefroy, forthcoming; for examples).
To investigate Sharia’s effect on fertility, I use the complete birth histories of the 2003
DHS to construct a panel where every woman contributes 7 observations, one for each year
between 1997 and 2003. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if woman i gave birth
in year t37 and I select women aged between 17 and 40 at the time of interview.38 I then
estimate difference-in-differences models similar to the ones outlined in equation 1. The
sample consists of 5,118 women and before the Sharia’s introduction on average 17% of
women give birth every year.
36Because children remain in the custody of the father after divorce, a large number of children is likely
to increase the cost of dissolving marriages for the husband. Moreover, numerous children may make it
unaffordable for men to take on other wives.
37Because the DHS interviews women March to August 2003, I use detailed information on the duration
of current pregnancies and code the dependent variable as equal to 1 in the year 2003 if woman i is pregnant
at the time of the interview and due to give birth before 2004. Further, I estimate the Sharia’s impact on
abortions and find no effect. The estimates are available upon request
38I include relatively young women in the analysis because teenage pregnancies are relatively common in
Nigeria. In fact, 11% of women aged 15 have started childbearing and in the North West 55% of 15-19 year
olds have had at least one child or a currently pregnant (National Population Commission, 1999).
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The results in columns 1 to 3 of table 8 show increases between 6 and 8 percentage points.
In column 4, I estimate whether the impact of the Sharia on fertility varies by the number
of children born before its introduction. For this, I estimate a triple-differences framework
where I interact the sharias× postt interaction with nochildi, a dummy equal to 1 if woman
i did not give birth to any child before the Sharia.39 The estimates show that the increase in
fertility is 7 percentage points larger for childless women. Nevertheless, the effect on women
with children, denoted by the sharias×postt interaction, remains large, 3 percentage points,
and statistically significant.
To investigate interactions between breastfeeding and fertility, I estimate whether the
effect of Sharia differs by whether or not the woman was breastfeeding at the time of the
Sharia introduction. Using breastfeeding histories, I define a dummy breastfeedingi=1 if
woman i was breastfeeding at the time of the Sharia introduction (between 1999 and 2001).
Column 5 of table 8 shows that birth rates increase by around 6 percentage points more for
women, who were not breastfeeding around the time of the Sharia introduction. However,
as before, Sharia also increases birth rates of women, who were breastfeeding at the Sharia’s
introduction (the coefficient on sharias × postt), by around 4 percentage points.
Previous evidence has pointed to negative associations between breastfeeding and fertility
(Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). Column 7 addresses this apparent contraction by
investigating Sharia’s effect on the exact timing of births. I select the sample of children
born between 1998 and 2001 with at least one younger sibling and estimate the effect on
succeeding birth intervals, defined as the time in months between births. The estimates
show an increase of around 2 months. This suggests that Muslim women in Sharia states,
who opt to have another child after the Sharia, wait around 2 months longer. This length
is comparable to the Sharia’s effect on breastfeeding (see table 2) suggesting that women
combine increases in breastfeeding with raising their fertility.
6.2 Sharia’s effect on gender gaps
Gender differences in the impact of the Sharia: Although the Sharia explicitly states
that boys and girls should be treated equally, other aspects of Islamic laws may introduce
gender differences in the returns parents associate with their children. For example, in
Islamic marriage rules, brides move with the husbands after marriage. Any assistance to
her birth family might be vetoed by her husband and in practice women often take care of
their parents in law. Consequently, sons commonly are the main caretakers of their parents.
Gender gaps have been highlighted in other low-income countries (Barcellos et al., 2014).
39I also control for the relevant double interactions sharias×nochildi, nochildi×postt and sharias×postt.
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Panel B of table 8 examines the effect of Sharia by the gender of the child. The results
suggest that improvements are strongest for boys whereas for girls outcomes hardly change.
One possible explanation is that parents respond to higher expected returns to sons by
investing more resources in young boys.
Bargaining power within the household: Sharia law assigns different roles to husband
and wife, which may affect intra-household bargaining power. Verse 34 of the Surah an-
Nisa, for instance, states that men are in charge of women and that righteous women are
devoutly obedient (Koran, 4:34). Although there are many different translations of this verse
(and many others) and its meaning is fiercely debated, parts of the Koran are explicit about
gender roles. Islamic marriage rules can also increase husbands’ bargaining power in more
indirect ways by, for instance, allowing polygamy or making divorce easier for the husband,
who retains children’s custody (Izugbara and Ezeh, 2010).
This section investigates the Sharia’s impact on two commonly used sets of proxies for
bargaining power: marital status and women’s work. Past research has pointed out that a
woman’s marital circumstances can affect her autonomy (Abadian, 1996). The analysis here
selects women, who married between 1997 and 2003 and estimates the impact of the Sharia
by comparing women who married before and after 2000.40 The specification is analogous to
the one outlined in equation 1; the control group consists of individuals residing in non Sharia
states, irrespective of religion. The parameters of the difference-in-differences specification
are reported in panel a of figure 6.41 The estimates suggest a positive and significant impact
on polygamy and on the age difference between husband and wife and a negative impact on
age at marriage, significant at the 10% level.
Female labour force participation is commonly viewed to be an important determinant
of her status in the household (Rahman and Rao, 2004). The analysis on women’s work
compares the work status of women across the 1999 and 2003 rounds of the DHS in a
difference-in-differences framework.42
40I drop women, who married more than once. For these individuals it is not possible to determine the
exact year of marriage.
41The dependent variables are a dummy for whether the wife is part of a polygamous union (row 1),
the wife’s age at marriage (row 2), the age difference between husband and wife (row 3) and a dummy for
whether the husband reports higher educational attainments than his wife (row 4). Circles denote point
estimates and horizontal bars the 95% confidence intervals.
42The two rounds of the DHS are two repeated cross sections. The dependent variables are binary
indicators for whether the woman is currently working (row 1), she is working from home (row 2) or away
from home (row 3) and whether she works for herself or someone in the family (row 4) or for someone
outside of the household (row 5). The variables in rows 2 to 5 are unconditional on woman’s work. The
dependent variable in row 6 takes the value 1 if the woman can decide by herself what to do with her earnings
(conditional on working and being paid in cash).
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The estimates reported in panel b of figure 6 suggest that the introduction of the Sharia
was accompanied by a large increase in female labour supply, around 30 percentage points.
The estimates in rows 2 to 5, however, show that this increase stems almost exclusively from
more women working from their own homes and for herself or someone in the family. This is
likely to increase time spent at home, which could be used to care for children (see Guryan
et al., 2008; for a review). Moreover, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) argue that a woman’s
labour force participation only increases her bargaining power if she works outside of the
home. Consequently, this increased labour force participation is unlikely to increase female
agency. Accordingly, the estimates in row 6 show decreases in decision making autonomy
regarding women’s income.
7 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the introduction of Islamic laws in north-
ern Nigeria led to marked increases in both the duration of breastfeeding and infant survival.
The results also suggest that the Sharia increased fertility and lowered female autonomy.
These findings may be of interest to policy makers in as far as they shed further light on how
exactly parents in low income countries make decisions regarding their children. The results
regarding breastfeeding, in particular, illustrate how changes in the religious environment
can influence parental behaviour. The sheer size of the Sharia’s effect on child welfare illus-
trates the importance of religious and cultural factors in determining how parents treat their
children. This insight is important for anyone interested in designing policies aimed at im-
proving child welfare. The results presented in this paper may also serve as an invitation to
involve religious leaders in family related policies. Collaborating with Islamic organisations
may avoid problems such as the ones witnessed during the resistance to the polio vaccine.
Finally, although these findings pertain to one particular case study, there are reasons to
believe that the results may also be relevant to other contexts. The Islamic laws introduced
in Nigeria are based on the Maliki school (Ostien, 2007). Sharia laws in the majority of
countries in North and Western Africa are based on the same doctrine and thus likely to have
common aspects. In any case, this paper has argued that the Sharia increases breastfeeding
and infant survival by specifying precisely how children should be protected and which
punishments can be expected in case of neglect or abandonment. This importance of child
welfare is a central feature of many Islamic societies around the world irrespective of their
history or geographical location.
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Figures
Figure 1: Nigeria - administrative borders
(a) Sharia and non Sharia states (b) High penalty state border
Notes: Maps report information on Nigeria’s administrative areas; Panel a shows the 36 states of Nigeria;
states adopting the Sharia (the Sharia states) are in grey; low penalty states are in light grey, these are
Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto: high penalty states are in dark grey, these are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Kano, Katsina, Niger, Yobe and Zamfara; Panel b shows the border separating high penalty states, i.e. states
that introduced strict child protection legislation shown in grey, from other states;
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Figure 2: Legislative aspects of the Sharia introduction
(a) Number of Sharia criminal judgements by year
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Notes: Figures report legislative information on introduction of Sharia. Panel a: figure reports number of
Islamic criminal judgements in Sharia states for the years 1998 to 2003; information is drawn from Weimann
(2007; 2010), who uses sources such as as articles from print media; Panel b: figure reports number of judges
employed in area courts, upper area courts, Sharia courts of appeal and district courts in Sharia states for
the years 1992 and 2008; information is drawn from Ostien (2011b).
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Figure 3: Breastfeeding and infant mortality over time in Sharia and non-Sharia states
Duration of breastfeeding
(a) Treatment group: Muslims
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(c) Treatment group: Muslims
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(d) Placebo: Christians
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Notes: Figure shows conditional differences in breastfeeding and infant mortality between Sharia and non-
Sharia states over time; circles denote point estimates for interaction between Sharia (a dummy taking
value 1 if individual i resides in state that introduced Sharia laws) on the one hand and child’s year of
birth (grouped in 6-month intervals) on the other; 95% confidence intervals are denoted as dashed lines; all
parameters are OLS and include state dummies; covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age,
latitude and longitude and dummies for child’s year of birth and gender; standard errors are clustered at
the state level; each child contributes 1 observation; panel a: dependent variable is the number of months a
child is breastfed for; sample consists of Muslim children born 1996 to 2001 drawn from 1999 and 2003 DHS;
panel b: dependent variable is the number of months a child is breastfed for; sample consists of Christian
children born 1996 to 2001 drawn from 1999 and 2003 DHS; panel c: dependent variable takes value 1 if child
dies within first year; sample consists of Muslim children born 1994 to 2002 and at least 14 months before
the interview drawn from 2003 DHS; panel d: dependent variable takes value 1 if child dies within first year;
sample consists of Christian children born 1994 to 2002 and at least 14 months before the interview drawn
from 2003 DHS.
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Figure 4: Infant mortality over time by distance to law enforcement and religious facilities
(a) By distance to closest law enforcement facility
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Notes: Figure shows conditional differences in infant mortality between high penalty and non-Sharia states
by distance between child and closest law enforcement facility (panel a) or Islamic centre (panel b); dependent
variable takes value 1 if child dies within first year; all parameters are OLS and include state dummies;
covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies for child’s
year of birth and gender; sample consists of Muslim children born 1994 to 2002 and at least 14 months
before the interview drawn from 2003 DHS; Christians in Sharia states and Muslims in low penalty states
are omitted; standard errors are clustered at the state level; panel a: circles denote point estimates for
interaction between child’s year of birth and a dummy taking the value 1 if individual i resides in high
penalty state and within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) from the closest law enforcement facility (denoted as
”close to law enforcement facility”); diamonds denote point estimates for interaction between child’s year
of birth and a dummy taking the value 1 if individual i resides in high penalty state and outside of 2.75km
(30 minutes walk) from the closest law enforcement facility (denoted as ”far from law enforcement facility”);
panel b: circles denote point estimates for interaction between child’s year of birth and a dummy taking
the value 1 if individual i resides in high penalty state and within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) from the
closest Islamic centre (denoted as ”close to Islamic centre”); diamonds denote point estimates for interaction
between child’s year of birth and a dummy taking the value 1 if individual i resides in state high penalty
state and outside of 2.75km (30 minutes walk) from the closest Islamic centre (denoted as ”far from Islamic
centre”).
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Figure 5: Geospatial differences at the high penalty border
Duration of breastfeeding
(a) Pre-period: Born before middle of 1999 (b) Post-period: Born after middle of 1999
Infant mortality
(c) Pre-period: Born 1994-1998 (d) Post-period: Born 1999-2002
Notes: Figures report means of months of breastfeeding and infant mortality for children living within 50km
of a border to a high penalty state; state border is denoted in red; clusters of respondents are denoted in
green; colour of area denotes the value of the mean values of the dependent variable; darker colours denote
higher values; panel a: dependent variable is the number of months a child is breastfed for; sample consists of
Muslim children born 1997 to middle of 1999 (i.e. the pre period) drawn from 2003 DHS; panel b: dependent
variable is the number of months a child is breastfed for; sample consists of Muslim children born middle
of 1999 to 2001 (i.e. the post period) drawn from 2003 DHS; panel c: dependent variable takes value 1 if
child dies within first year; sample consists of Muslim children born 1994 to middle of 1998 (i.e. the pre
period) drawn from 2003 DHS; panel d: dependent variable takes value 1 if child dies within first year; sample
consists of Muslim children born 1999 to 2002 and at least 14 months prior to the interview (i.e. the post
period) drawn from 2003 DHS.
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Figure 6: Effect of Sharia on proxies for intra-household bargaining power
(a) Marital status
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Notes: Figure reports effect of Sharia on marriage patterns and female labour force participation; symbols
represent point estimates for difference-in-differences parameters on postt × sharias interaction in equation
1; sharias dummy takes value 1 if respondent currently resides in state that introduced (or will introduce)
Sharia; circles denote point estimates, horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals; parameter estimates
reported are from ordinary least squares models; panel a: sample consists of women aged 15 to 49, who
married once between 1997 and 2003, drawn from 2003 DHS; postt = 1 if woman married in 2000 or later;
dependent variables are the following: a dummy for woman being part of a polygamous union (row 1),
woman’s age at marriage (row 2), age difference between husband and wife (row 3) and dummy for whether
husband is more educated than wife (row 4), covariates include education, religion, rural dummy, married
dummy and dummies for respondent’s birth cohort; standard errors are clustered at the state level; panel b:
sample consists of women aged 15 to 49 drawn from 1999 and 2003 DHS; postt = 1 if woman is drawn
from 2003 DHS; dependent variables are the following: a dummy for woman currently working (row 1), a
dummy for woman currently working from home, unconditional on work status (row 2), a dummy for woman
currently working away from home, unconditional on work status (row 3), a dummy for woman currently
working for herself or family member, unconditional on work status (row 4), a dummy for woman currently
working for someone not in her family, unconditional on work status (row 5), a dummy for woman deciding
herself what to do with her earnings, conditional on her working and earning money (row 6); covariates
include education, religion, rural dummy, married dummy and dummies for respondent’s birth cohort.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Whole Sharia non-Sharia High Low
Nigeria states states penalty penalty
states states
Panel A: Maternal characteristics
Children born (before 2000) 2.6 3.2 2.1 3.3 2.9
Percent Muslim 47 88 20 90 85
Percent with primary education 61 30 81 32 26
Wealth quintile 3.1 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.5
Panel B: Investments in children
Born before middle of 1999
Months of breastfeeding 16.4 17.2 15.6 16.6 18.6
Born before 1999
Infant mortality 0.135 0.154 0.115 0.156 0.148
Women 7,620 3,065 4,555 2,132 933
Notes: Table reports summary statistics by location of residence; all figures are drawn from the 2003 round
of the Nigerian DHS; column 1 refers to the whole of Nigeria, column 2 to states that introduced the Sharia,
column 3 to states that did not introduce the Sharia, column 4 refers to states that introduced the Sharia
and strict child protection legislation (i.e. high penalty states), column 5 refers to states that introduced
the Sharia and relatively loose child protection legislation (i.e. low penalty states); months of breastfeeding
are based on children born between 1998 and 1999 (i.e. the pre period); infant mortality is defined as the
proportion of children dying within the first year of life, numbers are based on children born between 1994
and 1998 (i.e. the pre period).
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Table 2: Effect of Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and infant mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimator Diff-in Diff-in Diff-in Diff-in Placebo Triple Diff-in
-diff -diff -diff -diff diff -diff
Treatment group Muslims Muslims Muslims Muslims Christians Muslims Muslims
in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia
Control group Everyone Everyone Christians Muslims Christians Christians Everyone
in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia
Panel A: Dependent variable: Months of breastfeeding
Post*Sharia 1.216 ∗ ∗ 1.239∗∗∗ 1.785 ∗ ∗ −0.723 −0.383
(0.448) (0.449) (0.814) (0.765) (0.777)
Post*Muslim 1.671 ∗ ∗
(0.695)
Post*Sharia*Muslim 2.183∗
(1.247)
Post*High penalty 1.622∗∗∗
(0.454)
Post*Low penalty 0.178
(0.489)
Children 3,540 3,537 1,957 2,208 1,444 3,719 3,537
Panel B: Dependent variable: Infant mortality indicator
Post*Sharia −0.041∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ 0.013 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018)
Post*Muslim −0.051 ∗ ∗
(0.017)
Post*Sharia*Muslim −0.102∗∗∗
(0.028)
Post*High penalty −0.049∗∗∗
(0.014)
Post*Low penalty −0.030∗
(0.016)
Children 8,644 8,634 4,801 5,382 3,683 9,065 8,634
Sample: Whole Whole Sharia Muslims Christians Whole Whole
Nigeria Nigeria states Nigeria Nigeria
Notes: Table reports estimates for the effect of the Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and infant mortality;
Sharia is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i resides in state that introduced Sharia laws; Muslim is a
dummy taking value 1 if individual i is Muslim; Low penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced
Sharia laws with low penalties for child protection laws (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto); High penalty
is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws with high penalties for child protection laws
(remaining Sharia states); the samples are: columns 1, 2 and 7: the whole of Nigeria excluding Christians in
Sharia states, column 3 : states that introduced the Sharia only; column 4: Muslims; column 5: Christians;
column 6: whole of Nigeria; all parameters are OLS estimates based 2003 DHS; all regressions include state
dummies; standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level; covariates include
education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies for child’s year of birth and
gender; each child contributes 1 observation; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. Panel A: dependent variable is the number of months children are breastfed; Post dummy takes value
1 if child is born after June 1999; sample: children born between 1998 and 2001. Panel B: dependent variable
takes value 1 if child died within first year of life; Post dummy takes value 1 if child is born in year 1999 or
after; sample: children born between 1994 and 2003 and born at least 14 months before interview.
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Table 3: Effect of Sharia by distance to law enforcement facilities and Islamic centres
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimator Diff-in Triple Diff-in Triple Diff-in Triple Diff-in Triple
-diff diff -diff diff -diff diff -diff diff
Treatment group Muslims in High penalty states
Control group Everyone Everyone Muslims Muslims Everyone Everyone Everyone Everyone
in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia
Sample All All All All Urban only Urban only All All
Panel A: Dependent variable: Months of breastfeeding
Post*High & close to hisbah 3.044∗∗∗ 3.590∗∗∗ 2.555∗∗∗
(0.639) (0.960) (0.568)
Post*High & far from hisbah 1.262 ∗ ∗ 1.765 ∗ ∗ 0.512
(0.513) (0.834) (1.119)
Post*High *close to hisbah 1.782∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗ 2.043∗
(0.599) (0.581) (1.131)
Post*High & close to mosque 1.563∗∗∗
(0.530)
Post*High & far from mosque 1.768∗∗∗
(0.612)
Post*High *close to mosque −0.219
(0.709)
Children 3,049 3,049 1,720 1,720 1,157 1,157 3,049 3,049
Panel B: Dependent variable: Infant mortality indicator
Post*High & close to hisbah −0.077∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.077 ∗ ∗
(0.022) (0.029) (0.035)
Post*High & far from hisbah −0.041∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.014) (0.022) (0.017)
Post*High *close to husbah −0.035 ∗ ∗ −0.034∗ −0.059∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.034)
Post*High & close to mosque −0.048∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post*High & far from mosque −0.051 ∗ ∗
(0.025)
Post*High *close to mosque 0.004
(0.028)
Children 7,419 7,419 4,167 4,167 2,761 2,761 4,167 4,167
Notes: Table reports estimates for the effect of the Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and infant mortality
by distance to nearest law enforcement facility and Islamic centre; High & close to hisbah is a dummy taking
value 1 if individual i resides in a high penalty state and within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) of nearest law
enforcement facility; High & far from hisbah is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i resides in a high penalty
state and outside of 2.75km (30 minutes walk) nearest law enforcement facility; High * close to hisbah is the
interaction between a dummy for individual i living in a high penalty state and a dummy for the individual
living within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) of nearest law enforcement facility; High & close to mosque is a
dummy taking value 1 if individual i resides in a high penalty state and within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) of
nearest Islamic centre; High & far from mosque is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i resides in a high
penalty state an outside of 2.75km (30 minutes walk) nearest Islamic centre; High * close to mosque is the
interaction between a dummy for individual i living in a high penalty state and a dummy for the individual
living within 2.75km (30 minutes walk) of nearest Islamic centre; sample consists of Muslim children in high
penalty states and all children in non-Sharia states in 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and Muslim children in non-Sharia
states in columns 3 and 4; Muslims in low penalty states are omitted; all parameters are OLS estimates
based 2003 DHS; all regressions include state dummies; standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the state level; covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude
and dummies for child’s year of birth and gender; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels. Panel A: dependent variable is the number of months children are breastfed; Post dummy takes
value 1 if child is born after June 1999; sample: children born between 1998 and 2001. Panel B: dependent
variable takes value 1 if child died within first year of life; Post dummy takes value 1 if child is born in year
1999 or after; sample: children born between 1994 and 2003 and born at least 14 months before interview.
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Table 5: Effect of Sharia on law enforcement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables: number of:
Prison Adjournments Judgements Judgements
inmates by courts on abandoned on child
children defilement
Mean in pre-period 1340 910 9.9 6.8
Post*Sharia 196.8∗ −1, 018.1∗ 5.39 ∗ ∗ 6.40 ∗ ∗
(111.1) (587.6) (1.84) (2.37)
States 36 37 11 12
R squared 0.236 0.321 0.256 0.739
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes
Population controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table reports effect of Sharia on law enforcement; parameter estimates reported are from ordinary
least squares model; dependent variable in column 1 is the number of prison inmates, in column 2 the number
of cases adjourned at the instance of court, in column 3 the number of times courts judged a child to be
abandoned, in column 4 the number of times courts judged a minor to be defiled; years in column 1 are 1995
to 2006, years in column 2 are 1995 to 2004, years in columns 3 and 4 are 1996 to 1998 and 2002 to 2003;
Post is a dummy taking value 1 if t ≥ 2000; Sharia is a dummy taking value 1 if state s introduced Sharia;
regressions control for year and state fixed effects as well as state population and its square; standard errors
are clustered at state level; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; all information
was digitised from various reports of the National Abstract of Nigeria; estimates of population by state was
digitised from various National Abstracts of Statistics; both documents are published by the government of
Nigeria.
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Table 6: Importance of confounding factors: effect of Sharia on social unrest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Incidences of any type of violence Incidences of violence against civilians
Mean in pre-period 4.79 2.06 1.29 0.67
Post*Sharia 1.769 −0.846 −0.235 −1.928
(1.355) (4.233) (0.433) (2.070)
Post*High penalty 2.205 −0.110
(1.457) (0.464)
Post*Low penalty 0.952 −0.469
(1.296) (0.468)
Sample Whole Border Whole Border Whole Border
Nigeria states Nigeria states Nigeria states
Notes: Table reports effect of Sharia on incidences of violence; Sharia is a dummy taking value 1 if state s
introduced Sharia; parameter estimates reported are from ordinary least squares model; dependent variable
in columns 1, 2 and 3 is the number of incidences of any type of violence per state per year; dependent
variable in columns 4, 5 and 6 is the number of incidences of violence against civilians per state per year;
years 1997 to 2004; Post is a dummy taking value 1 if year ≥ 2000; Low penalty is a dummy taking value 1
if state introduced Sharia laws but with low penalties for child protection laws (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and
Sokoto); High penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with high penalties for
child protection laws (remaining Sharia states); Border states are states that are adjacent to Sharia border;
data are drawn from ACLED data base.
40
Table 7: Importance of confounding factors: state specific policies and migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: State-specific policies
Dependent variable Recurrent Capital Total
p.c. exp. p.c. exp. p.c. exp.
Mean in pre-period 304 134 438
Post*Sharia −7.85 −6.95 −51.53
(93.0) (66.2) (146.6)
States 30 30 30
Panel B: Dependent variable: Indicator for migration - DHS
Treatment group Muslims Muslims Muslims Christians Muslims Muslims
Sharia Sharia Sharia Sharia Sharia high pen.
Control group Everyone Christians Muslims Christians Everyone Muslims
non-Sharia Sharia non-Sharia non-Sharia non-Sharia low pen.
≤50km
Post*Sharia −0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Post*Muslim −0.006
(0.009)
Post*High penalty 0.001 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
Post*Low penalty −0.004
(0.005)
Women 7,247 3,061 3601 4,011 7,247 1,759
Panel C: Dependent variable: One household member migrated - MHS
Mean in pre-period 0.085 0.085
Post*Sharia −0.007 −0.019
(0.012) (0.017)
Households 6,465 2469
Notes: Panel A: dependent variable in column 1 is recurrent in column 2 capital and in column 3 total real
per capita expenditure; sample consists of 30 states of Nigeria, no information was available for Bayelsa,
Ebonyi, Ekiti, Gombe, Nassarawa and Zamfara; each state contributes 6 observations for years 1996 - 1998
and 2001 - 2003; local governmental expenditures were digitised from reports of the Central Bank of Nigeria
and deflated using CPI from the Central Bank of Nigeria (various years); estimates of population by state was
digitised from various National Abstracts of Statistics; Panel B: dependent variable is indicator taking value
1 if woman i moved to current residence in year t; sample consists of women aged between 15 and 49 drawn
from 2003 Nigerian DHS; each woman contributes 7 observations, one for each year between 1997 and 2003;
column 1 compares Muslims in Sharia states to individuals in non-Sharia states, column 2 compares Muslims
in Sharia states to Christians in Sharia states, column 3 compares Muslims in Sharia states to Muslims in non-
Sharia states, column 4 compares Christians in Sharia and non-Sharia states, column 5 compares Muslims
in low and high penalty states to individuals non-Sharia states, column 6 compares Muslims in high penalty
states to individuals low penalty and non-Sharia states living within 50km of the border, covariates include
education, religion, rural dummy, number of children and year of birth. Panel C: data used drawn from
Migration and Remittances Household Surveys for Nigeria; each household contributes 3 observations, one
for the years 1990-95, 1995-99 and 2000-05; dependent variable takes value 1 if household reports that one
member migrated in that specific time interval within Nigeria; controls include age and gender of household
head and whether household has bank account.
41
Table 8: Effect of Sharia on birth rates and timing of births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Fertility behaviour
Treatment group Muslims Muslims Muslims Muslims Muslims Muslims
in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia
Control group Everyone Christians Muslims Everyone Everyone Everyone
in non-Sharia in Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia
Sample: Whole Whole Sharia Sharia No kids Kids born
Nigeria Nigeria states states pre-1997 1998-2001
Dependent variable Birth indicator Birth
Interval
Post*Sharia 0.055∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 2.162 ∗ ∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.834)
Post*Muslim 0.084∗∗∗
(0.010)
Post*Sharia*No Children 0.073∗∗∗
(0.014)
Post*Sharia*Breasfteeding 0.062∗∗∗
(0.014)
Women 5,375 2,277 2,679 5,375 5,375 -
Children 2,441
Panel B: Gender differences
Treatment group Muslims in Sharia states
Control group Everyone in non-Sharia states
Sample: Boys Girls Boys Girls
Dependent variable Months breastfeeding Infant mortality
Post*Sharia 1.436 ∗ ∗ 1.044 −0.056 ∗ ∗ −0.036∗
(0.693) (0.763) (0.021) (0.021)
Children 1,785 1,752 4,407 4,227
Notes: Table reports estimates for the effect of the Sharia on fertility; ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; all estimates are based 2003 DHS for Nigeria and are derived from ordinary
least squares models; Panel A: each woman contributes 7 observations, one for each year between 1997 and
2003; dependent variable takes value 1 if woman i gives birth in year t; Post is a dummy taking value 1 if t >
2000; sharia is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i resides in state that introduced Sharia laws; Muslim is
a dummy taking value 1 if individual i is Muslim; No Children is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i did
not have children in 1997; Breasfteeding is a dummy taking value 1 if individual i reports to have breastfed
between 1999 and 2000; sample consists of women aged between 17 and 40 at time of interview; covariates
include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies for child’s year of birth
and gender; covariates include education, religion, rural dummy, number of children and year of birth. the
samples are defined as follows: columns 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6: the whole of Nigeria excluding Christians in Sharia
states, column 2 : states that introduced the Sharia only. Panel B: dependent variable is the number of
months children are breastfed, sample consists of children born between 1998 and 2001, and Post dummy
takes value 1 if child is born after June 1999 in columns 1 and 2; dependent variable takes value 1 if child
died within first year of life, sample: children born between 1994 and 2003 and born at least 14 months
before interview, and Post dummy takes value 1 if child is born in year 1999 or after in columns 3 and 4;
sample consists of boys in columns 1 and 3 and girls in columns 2 and 4.
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Appendices
A Additional details about the Sharia in Nigeria
The table below lays out the changes in child protection laws induced by the Sharia outlined
in section 2.1.2.
(1) (2)
Offence Punishment
Secular law Sharia ciminal law
Foundation English common law Koran and hadiths
Application Northern states: ≤ 1999 Northern states: ≥ 2000
Southern states: throughout Southern states: never
1. Child abandonment Loss of custody 3 years imprisonment
of child + 40 lashes
2. Child neglect
In general Loss of custody 1 year imprisonment
of child + fine
(unspecified amount)
If resulting in harm 1 year inprisonment 5 years imprisonment
+ fine of 100 camels
(≈ USD13,700 - 54,800)
Notes: Nothern states are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto,
Yobe and Zamfara state; southern states are all remaining states; sources for punishments in column 1:
Uzodike (1990) source for punishments in column 2: Sharia Penal Code reported by Ostien (2011)
Further aspects of Sharia law that may be of interest are:
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• Islam encourages marriage and sees it as an integral part of life.43 Whilst married, the
husband is obliged to maintain his wife to the same standard of her native family. The
punishments for neglecting to maintain one’s family are codified as Ta’azir offences.
Individuals who are able to but choose not to maintain their family (including wife)
are classified as an idle person. This offence is punishable with imprisonment of up to
one year and liable to caning of up to twenty lashes. The punishments for re-offenders
are a prison sentence of up to two years and up to 50 lashes.44
• Sharia law does not specify any number of children a couple should have. Islam,
however, places a high value on children45 and views them as a significant part of
marriage.46 Abortions, moreover, are forbidden.47 The specified punishment are a fine
(ghurrah) of 5 camels, 50 gold dinars or 600 silver dirhams and/or lashes and/or an
imprisonment of up to three years.48
• Although under Sharia law both sons and daughters are equally responsible for their
parents, Islamic marriage rules imply that sons are more likely to maintain their parents
than daughters. After marriage, a woman leaves her parental family to move with her
husband’s and requires his permission before transferring any resources to her parents.
The daughter’s husband may thus veto her sustaining her parents. Moreover, a married
woman is integrated in the family of her husband and takes over many caring duties
for her in-laws.
• Islamic inheritance rules are multifaceted and are laid out only shortly. After the
death of the husband, the wife inherits a quarter of his property if she is childless.
After funeral expenses and any remaining debts have been settled. If the couple had
children, the wife receives an eight. Most of the remaining estate is divided amongst
the children of the deceased. When allocating inheritance, male sons receive twice the
share of females.Allah commands you regarding your children. For the male a share
equivalent to that of two females, Koran (4:11).
43And marry those among you who are single and those who are fit among your male slaves and your
female slaves; if they are needy, Allah will make them free from want out of His grace; and Allah is Ample-
giving, Knowing. (Surah an-Nur, 24:32).
44Ostien, 2011b; §376.
45For instance: O my Lord! Grant me from You, a good offspring. (Koran 3:38).
46For instance: We indeed sent messengers before you (O Muhammad), and We assigned them wives and
children (Koran 13:38).
47Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in
good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished, Ostien 2011b; SPC §206.
48Ostien, 2011b; §209.
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B Additional maps
(a) Clusters of 2003 DHS (b) High penalty border
(c) High penalty border for Sharia only (d) Law enforcement facilities in Sharia states
(e) Islamic centres in Sharia states
Notes: Maps report location of clusters used by the 2003 Nigerian Demographic Health Survey; Panel a all
clusters of 2003 Nigerian DHS; Panel b clusters of 2003 Nigerian DHS and border between high penalty and
other states; Panel c clusters of 2003 Nigerian DHS and border between high penalty and low penalty states.
Panel d shows the geographical locations of law enforcement facilities such as hisbah stations and police
stations, information drawn from Panel e shows the geographical locations of Mosques and other Islamic
centres in Nigeria, information drawn from GRID3 project.
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C Attitudes and behaviour commonly associated with
Islam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Member Identifies Member Identifies
Dependent variable of a as of a as
mosque Muslim mosque Muslim
Round of Afrobarometer 1999 & 2003 1999
High Penalty*Post 0.090 −0.169
(0.082) (0.166)
State Av. of Muslims 0.511∗∗∗ 0.180 ∗ ∗
(0.151) (0.091)
Observations 2,101 2,086 1,287 1,287
Sample Border states Sharia states
Religion Muslims
Controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table reports effect of Sharia on Mosque attendance and religious identification; dependent variable
in columns 1 and 3 is a dummy taking value 1 if respondent is an active or inactive member of a mosque; in
columns 2 and 4 is a dummy taking value 1 if respondent identifies (apart from being Nigerian) as Muslim;
High penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with high penalties for child
protection laws; State Av. of Muslims is the proportion of respondents for each state reporting they are
Muslim; sample consists of Muslims only; sample in columns 1 and 2 is from 1999 and 2003 rounds of
Afrobarometer and Muslims living in border states only; border states are states are adjacent to the high
penalty border; sample in columns 3 and 4 is from 1999 round of Afrobarometer and Muslims living in
Sharia states only; covariates include education, religion, rural dummy, married dummy and dummies for
respondent’s birth cohort.
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D Effect of Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and
infant mortality - Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent variable: Months of breastfeeding
Post*High penalty 1.633 ∗ ∗ 1.574 ∗ ∗ 1.582 ∗ ∗ 1.591∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗
(0.708) (0.705) (0.746) (0.465) (0.508) (0.533)
Post*Low penalty 0.374 0.300 0.466 0.176 0.119 0.495
(0.767) (0.764) (0.743) (0.489) (0.765) (0.483)
Children 3,098 2,844 2,336 3,434 2,823 3,098
Sample: Born Born Born No No No
1.99-02 1.99-6.01 1.99-1.01 Zamfara Shia Migrants
Panel B: Dependent variable: Neonatal mortality indicator
Post*High penalty −0.054∗∗∗ −0.030 ∗ ∗ −0.030∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
Post*Low penalty −0.041 ∗ ∗ −0.020 −0.027 −0.047∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Children 7,954 5,888 4,703 9,792 8,083 8,934
Sample: Born Born Born No No No
1995-2002 1996-2001 6.96-6.00 Zamfara Shia Migrants
Notes: Table reports estimates for the effect of the Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and infant mortality;
all estimates are based 2003 DHS for Nigeria and are derived from ordinary least squares models; Low penalty
is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with low penalties for child protection laws
(Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto); High penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia
laws but with high penalties for child protection laws (remaining Sharia states); all regressions include state
dummies; standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state level; covariates include
education, rural dummy, mother’s year of birth and dummies for child’s year of birth, gender and birth
order. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Panel A: dependent variable is
the number of months children are breastfed; Post is a dummy taking value 1 if child is born after June
1999; sample consists of children born between 1998 and 2001; each child contributes 1 observation; sample
in columns 1, 2 and 3 are children born between January 1999 and 2002, January 1999 and June 2001 and
January 1999 and January 2002, respectively; sample in column 4 excludes individuals in Zamfara state;
sample in column 5 excludes individuals in Kano, Katsina, Kaduna and Sokoto states, which have a Shia
minority; sample in column 5 excludes individuals, who migrated after the Sharia introduction; Panel B:
dependent variable takes value 1 if child died within first year of life; Post is a dummy taking value 1 if
child is born in year 1999 or after; sample consists of children born between 1994 and 2002 and aged at
least 14 months at interview; each child contributes 1 observation; sample in columns 1, 2 and 3 are children
born between 1995 and 2002, 1996 and 2001 and June 1996 and June 2001, respectively; sample in column
4 excludes individuals in Zamfara state; sample in column 5 excludes individuals in Kano, Katsina, Kaduna
and Sokoto states, which have a Shia minority; sample in column 5 excludes individuals, who migrated after
the Sharia introduction.
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E Additional Geospatial estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment group Muslims in high penalty states
Control group Muslims in low penalty and in non-Sharia states
Panel A: Dependent variable: Months of breastfeeding
High Penalty*Post 1.757∗∗∗ 2.053 ∗ ∗ 1.870∗∗∗ 1.770∗∗∗ 2.054 ∗ ∗ 1.843∗∗∗ 1.141∗ 1.649 ∗ ∗ 1.849 ∗ ∗
(0.563) (0.767) (0.623) (0.562) (0.779) (0.626) (0.582) (0.732) (0.808)
Children 1,634 1,373 1,171 1,634 1,373 1,171 1,634 1,373 1,171
Panel B: Dependent variable: Infant mortality indicator
High Penalty*Post −0.062∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.041 ∗ ∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.042 ∗ ∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Children 3,985 3,290 2,794 3,985 3,290 2,794 3,985 3,290 2,794
Specification for f(location) longitude+ latitude longitude+ latitude longitude+ latitude
+distance to border +distance to border +post× (longitude+ latitude)
+longitude2 + latitude2
+distance to border2
Distance to border: ≤100km ≤75km ≤50km ≤100km ≤75km ≤50km ≤100km ≤75km ≤50km
Notes: Table reports estimates for the effect of the Sharia on duration of breastfeeding and infant mortality
for individuals living close to the high penalty states border; High penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if
state introduced Sharia laws with high penalties for child protection laws (Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kano,
Katsina, Niger, Yobe and Zamfara); all regressions control for latitude, longitude, dummies for 10 segments
of the border, distance to border and its square; the samples are: columns 1, 2 and 3: Muslims living in
high penalty, low penalty and non-Sharia states; columns 4, 5 and 6: Muslims living in high penalty and
low penalty states; columns 7, 8 and 9: Christians living in high penalty, low penalty and non-Sharia states;
distance to border is defined as the areal distance between the individual’s GPS coordinate and the closest
point on the border to a high penalty state; the distances are defined as follows columns 1, 4 and 7: 100km,
columns 2, 5 and 8: 75km, columns 3, 6 and 9: 50km, regressions control for location (f(location)) as follows
columns 1-3: respondent’s latitude, longitude and distance to high penalty border; columns 4-6: respondent’s
latitude, longitude and distance to high penalty border and their square; columns 7-9: respondent’s latitude
and longitude and their interaction with the post dummy; all parameters are OLS estimates based 2003 DHS;
all regressions include state dummies; standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state level; covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies
for child’s year of birth and gender; each child contributes 1 observation; ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Panel A: dependent variable is the number of months children are breastfed;
Post dummy takes value 1 if child is born after June 1999; sample: children born between 1998 and 2001.
Panel B: dependent variable takes value 1 if child died within first year of life; Post dummy takes value 1
if child is born in year 1999 or after; sample: children born between 1994 and 2003 and born at least 14
months before interview.
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F Testing for parallel trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group Muslims Muslims Christians Muslims
in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia in Sharia
Control group Everyone Muslim Christians Everyone
in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia in non-Sharia
Panel A: Months of breastfeeding
Sharia*Timetrend 0.004 0.027 −0.045
(0.027) (0.050) (0.058)
High Penalty*Timetrend −0.018
(0.031)
Low penalty*Timetrend 0.060
(0.037)
Children 1,956 1,147 882 1,956
Panel B: Infant indicator
Sharia*Timetrend −0.00014 −0.00003 0.00119
(0.00060) (0.00094) (0.00071)
High Penalty*Timetrend −0.00016
(0.00073)
Low penalty*Timetrend −0.00008
(0.00055)
Children 5,038 3,132 2,168 5,038
Notes: Table tests for parallel trends before the introduction of the Sharia for duration of breastfeeding and
infant mortality; all estimates are derived from ordinary least squares models; Sharia is a dummy taking
value 1 if individual i resides in state that introduced Sharia laws; Timetrend is a continuous variable for the
child’s month of birth; Low penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with low
penalties for child protection laws (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and Sokoto); High penalty is a dummy taking
value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with high penalties for child protection laws (the remaining Sharia
states); the samples are defined as follows: columns 1 and 4: the whole of Nigeria excluding Christians in
Sharia states, column 2: Muslims, column 3: Christians, all parameters are OLS estimates based 2003 DHS;
all regressions include state dummies; standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state level; covariates include education, rural dummy, mother’s age, latitude and longitude and dummies
for child’s year of birth and gender; each child contributes 1 observation; ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Panel A: dependent variable is the number of months children are breastfed;
sample consists of children born between 1996 and June 1999, i.e. the pre period, drawn from 1999 and
2003 DHS; Panel B: dependent variable takes value 1 if child died within first life of life; sample consists of
children born between 1994 and 1998, i.e. the pre-period, drawn from 2003 DHS.
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G Incidences of violence
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Notes: Figures show incidences of violence between 1997 and 2009; Low penalty is a dummy taking value 1
if state introduced Sharia laws but with low penalties for child protection laws (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi and
Sokoto); High penalty is a dummy taking value 1 if state introduced Sharia laws but with high penalties for
child protection laws (remaining Sharia states); data are drawn from ACLED data base.
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H Event studies for state expenditures and migration
Expenditures of states
(a) Means
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(b) Conditional differences
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(d) Conditional differences
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Notes: Panels a and b: variables reported are means of real expenditure by local governments per inhab-
itants for years 1996 to 2003; panel a shows means over time, panel b conditional difference (solid line)
along with 95% confidence intervals; each state contributes 6 observations, one for each year between 1996
and 1998 and 2001 and 2003; information has been digitised from Annual Report of the Central Bank of
Nigeria (various years) for data on state expenditures and Annual Abstract of Statistics for Nigeria (various
years) for population of estimates for states; nominal expenditures have been deflated using Consumer Price
Indexes from the Central Bank of Nigeria (various years); Panels c and d: Figure shows unconditional and
conditional migration estimates over time for Sharia and non Sharia states; dependent variable is indicator
taking value 1 if woman i moved to current residence in year t; panel c shows polynomially smoothed means
of migration indicator by year, panel d conditional difference (solid line) along with 95% confidence intervals;
sample consists of women aged between 15 and 49 at the time of interview drawn from 2003 Nigerian DHS;
each woman contributes 7 observations, one for each year between 1997 and 2003; individuals in Sharia states
are all Muslim, individuals in non Sharia states are selected irrespective of religion.
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I Health facilities in Sharia and non Sharia states
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Notes: Figure reports number of health facilities per million inhabitants in Sharia and non Sharia states;
information has been digitised from National Abstract of Statistics for Nigeria Reports (various years).
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J Self-reported reasons for migration
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Notes: Figure shows self reported primary reason for migration for individuals migrating before and after
2000; sample consists of individuals, who migrated from their major residence; data are drawn from Migration
Household Survey (2010); respondents in panel a reported education as their main reason for migration;
respondents in panel b reported employment related issues as their main reason for migration; respondents
in panel c reported marital issues as their main reason for migration; respondents in panel d reported family
related issues as their main reason for migration; respondents in panel e reported conflict as their main
reason for migration.
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